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Race, Inequality and Urbanisation in 




The city of Johannesburg lies at the heart of a sprawling metropolis. This 
metropolis, which we shall call the Johannesburg region, roughly corresponds 
with the boundaries of Gauteng Province.1 It stretches from Soshanguve in the 
north to Vanderbijlpark in the south and from Carletonville in the west to 
Springs in the east (Fig.1). While Johannesburg is an obvious example of a large 
city in a poor country that is riddled by social and economic inequality, there is a 
certain irony in its portrayal as a world city. After all, only five years ago, 
Johannesburg was the hub of a pariah nation that was the object of one of the 
most successful international sanctions campaigns. Notwithstanding the impact 
of the boycott against apartheid, Johannesburg has long served as the major 
urban centre of southern Africa. It is an unusually cosmopolitan city, with 
extensive demographic, political, and economic connections with Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and North America, that date back to colonial times (Parnell and Pirie, 
1991). Increasingly strong links are now also being forged with Australasia 
through immigration and sport. 
Johannesburg is the economic hub of both South Africa and the Southern 
African region. As an urban giant located in a middle income country amidst 
extremely poor nations like Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Namibia and Swaziland, Johannesburg dominates the southern African region.2 
Within South Africa, the dominance of the Johannesburg region is unquestioned. 
1 A note on terminology: This metropolis used to be called the ‘PWV’, an acronym for the 
‘Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Complex’. This region has since been given the 
status of a province and is now known as ‘Gauteng’ (the place of gold). However, the 
names ‘PWV’ and ‘Gauteng’ are not known in international circles so, for the purposes of 
this article, we have chosen to name this metropolitan area the ‘Johannesburg region’ or 
simply ‘Johannesburg’. When we refer to the city of Johannesburg, we will refer to its 
formal administrative designation as the ‘Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area’ or 
simply as the ‘city of Johannesburg’. The Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council is 
a relatively new metropolitan authority and includes the erstwhile local authorities of 
Johannesburg, Randburg, Roodepoort, Sandton and Soweto (see Fig.1). 




The coastal centres of Cape Town and Durban, although they are large and 
important cities, do not compete with the political and economic power of the 
Johannesburg region. Johannesburg is therefore set to remain the economic heart 
of both South and Southern Africa (Rogerson, 1995). 
Several authors have made the case for Johannesburg to be seen as a regional, if 
not a world, city (Friedman, 1995; Simon, 1995). This claim has some 
substance. Even by global standards, the number of international flights from 
Johannesburg airport is significant. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange is the 
12th most powerful in the world, reflecting the place of South Africa at the 
leading edge of emerging nations (Beavon, 1997). Other indicators of global 
connectivity abound: telephone links and internet usage (South Africa ranks 20th 
in connections), the 5.9 million square metres of high quality office (to which 
thousands of metres of new A-grade office space are added each year) (Beavon, 
1997), the concentration of office headquarters (Rogerson, 1984), and the 
growing percentage of the working population born outside the country (Morris, 
1999; McDonald et al, 1999). 
Our concern in this article is not to follow the train of analysis that lists the 
indicators of Johannesburg’s world city status. Nor do we seek to debate the 
opportunities or the constraints of globalisation for Southern Africa’s primary 
city. Instead, we have chosen to reflect on the world city literature to extract 
analytical tools for reinterpreting urban change in Johannesburg in the post-
World War Two period. Our attention falls specifically on the utility of linking 
global economic and demographic shifts to the changing patterns of employment 
inequality within the city. This article is thus a study of the changing 
relationships between urbanisation, racial inequality and the structure of the 








                                          
1. Race, Inequality and Urbanisation in the 
Johannesburg Region 
Since Johannesburg was first settled in the late 19th Century, it has been a city of 
immigrants. Migration from places as diverse as Greece, Britain, Germany, 
Zambia, Angola, India and Malaysia meant that it was also an ethnically and 
racially mixed city (Parnell, 1991). As a quasi-colonial city, it was structured in 
ways that reinforced racial inequality. However, this pattern of racial inequality 
has changed dramatically over the last half century. Whereas racial inequality 
was once the touchstone of social inequality in South Africa, inter-racial 
inequality is increasingly being overshadowed by intra-racial inequality. The 
most recent analysis of national trends in household income show that, although 
inter-racial inequality has decreased over the past two decades or so, this trend 
has not been accompanied by any decrease in inequality among the population 
as a whole (Whiteford and McGrath, 1994). Instead, figures for 1975 and 1991 
show that household income inequality remained very high and unchanged, 
hovering at a Gini coefficient of 0.68. South Africa has one of the highest Gini 
coefficients in the world, comparable with that of Brazil.3 
Whiteford and McGrath (1994) argue that the erosion of inter-racial inequality 
has not been accompanied by a general decline of inequality because intra-racial 
household income inequality has grown. In other words, although there has been 
a general redistribution of income from whites, on one hand, to Africans, 
coloureds and Indians, on the other, this has not affected the general pattern of 
household income inequality because most of the increased income which 
accrued to the black population has gone to the richest black households. Their 
evidence from the Population Censuses shows that between 1975 and 1991, the 
richest 20% of black households became richer in absolute terms. By contrast, 
the poorest 80% of black households became poorer. This shift in the racial 
distribution of household income has increased intra-racial inequality to the 
extent that the Gini coefficient for African households was as high as 0.62 in 
1991, almost as high as the Gini coefficient for all households (ibid: 51). This 
means that intra-racial household income inequality contributed as much as 75% 
to overall inequality, with inter-racial inequality contributing only 25% (ibid: 
57). Rising income inequality was not restricted to black households. Although 
the incomes of the richest 20% of white households remained unchanged, the 
incomes of the poorest 40% of white households fell in absolute terms 
(Whiteford and McGrath, 1994: 42-45). 
3 South Africa has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world, comparable with that 
of Brazil. (Whiteford, Posel and Kelatwang, 1995).  
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These findings upset the conventional interpretations of South African society 
that have tended to emphasise the extent and character of inter-racial inequality 
rather than intra-racial inequality (Lemon, 1991). The reasons why South 
African scholarship has tended to emphasise inter-racial inequality are obvious: 
since the earliest colonial times, the South African state has pursued racially 
discriminatory policies. In more recent decades, the apartheid state was 
responsible for racially discriminatory policies and laws that regulated the 
urbanisation, education, employment, residence and political rights of black 
South Africans. Scholars who opposed the racist policies of the apartheid 
Government were therefore keen to identify the relationship between racially 
discriminatory state policy on one hand, and racial inequality, on the other. 
Although this approach to urban studies correctly identified the extent and 
character of inter-racial inequality and its relationship to Government policy, it 
has generally failed to identify, let alone explain, the rise in intra-racial 
inequality over the past few decades. 
There is another obvious reason why we can no longer rely on racially 
discriminatory Government policies to explain inequality in South Africa. This 
is because the new democratically elected South African Government has 
abolished all racially discriminatory legislation, including job reservation. Of 
course, the historical effects of racial discrimination during the apartheid period 
will continue to cause inter-racial inequality for many years to come. 
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that there are other causes of inequality that 
are at work in South Africa and that these causes are driven by intra-racial 
divisions. Moreover, these intra-racial dynamics of inequality are increasingly 
the main cause of inequality within South African society generally, and urban 
society more directly. Whereas the most startling feature of the South African 
city was once its division along racial lines, new and less obvious cleavages are 
now more significant, especially within the African urban population.  
Recent research has examined in detail trends in intra-racial inequality in South 
Africa as a whole (see Nattrass and Seekings, 2001; Bhorat et al, 2001; Seekings 
and Nattrass, forthcoming). But there has been little work focusing specifically 
on intra-racial inequality in urban areas. In this paper we draw upon ideas 
developed to explain inequality in other world city contexts, to examine certain 
social dynamics which may be contributing towards  rising inequality amongst 
the African population.4 
4 This analysis of inequality from the perspective of the relationship between the changing 
labour force and urban population growth builds on earlier work on Johannesburg that 
sought to contextualise the growth in urban poverty (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 
1999).   
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In our search for fresh ideas about the relationship between urbanisation and 
racial inequality, we were drawn to the international literature on social 
polarisation, the underclass and the emergence of global cities (Fainstein et al, 
1992; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991; O’Loughlin and Friedrichs, 1996; Sassen, 
1994; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996; Wilson, 1987). Although contributions 
to this literature may disagree on the character of the changes and their 
implications for racial and ethnic inequality, their arguments share the following 
conceptual structure. Inequality is explained, at least in part, in terms of the 
changing relationships between the urban demand for different kinds of labour, 
on one hand, and the level of skill that is offered by newcomers to the city, on 
the other. For example, the most common argument is that newcomers, be they 
urbanising rural migrants or foreign immigrants, are poorly educated and 
therefore eligible only for relatively unskilled manual jobs. However, during the 
second half of this century, there have been important changes in the demand for 
such unskilled manual work in the cities, which has changed patterns of urban 
inequality. 
Up until the 1960s, newcomers to the city could be assured of unskilled 
employment in the unionised manufacturing sector. This form of employment 
offered relatively high and stable wages as well as the opportunity for upward 
mobility. Since then, however, many cities in the advanced capitalist countries 
have seen the decline of the manufacturing sector and the rise of the service 
sector. Unlike the manufacturing economy of old, the new service economy 
lacks jobs in the middle income range. Instead, it features a polarised job 
market, requiring high levels of skill at the professional end and low levels of 
skill at the other, with little opportunity for upward occupational mobility. 
Furthermore, the proportion of low-skilled jobs in the new service economy is 
relatively low. This economic restructuring has meant that unskilled newcomers 
to the city are less likely to secure employment. And even if they do find 
employment, it is more than likely to be in dead-end and low-paying service 
sector jobs. In the United States, this argument has been used to explain, at least 
in part, the poor performance of racial and ethnic minorities in the urban labour 
market (Ortiz, 1996; Wilson, 1987). With this general hypothesis in mind, we 
now turn to the analysis of population and employment trends in the 
Johannesburg region. 
These population and employment trends are based on data from the Population 
Censuses of 1946, 1951, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991 and 1996. Population and 
employment estimates are published for each magisterial district. The 
boundaries of these magisterial districts usually coincide with the boundaries of 
local authorities. Where boundaries of these administrative bodies do not 
coincide, the census reports provided tables that allowed us to correct the 
population and employment estimates for each local authority. Obviously, the 
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boundaries of the magisterial districts have changed considerably over the 
years. However, the pattern was for magisterial districts to be sub-divided as 
their populations grew in size. This made it possible for us simply to add new 
magisterial districts to our list as the number of magisterial districts within the 
boundary of the present day Johannesburg region grew. The population and 
employment estimates for the Johannesburg region are therefore the sum of the 
figures for the magisterial districts of Alberton, Benoni, Boksburg, Brakpan, 
Brits, Bronhorstspruit, Cullinan, Germiston, Heidelberg, Johannesburg, 
Kempton Park, Krugersdorp, Nigel, Oberholzer, Pretoria, Randburg, 
Randfontein, Roodepoort, Soshanguve, Springs, Vanderbijl Park, Vereeniging, 
Westonaria and Wonderboom. The estimates for the Greater Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Council are the sum of the estimates for the magisterial districts of 
Johannesburg, Randburg and Roodepoort. 
2. Population Trends 
In 1996, the urban population of the Johannesburg region was about 7.3 million, 
which is one-third of the national urban population of 21.8 million. The annual 
growth rate in the population of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 
has declined from 3.2% between 1946 and 1951 to 0.7% between 1991 and 
1996. By comparison, the population of the Johannesburg region as a whole has 
shown a higher and more enduring rate of growth. The annual population 
growth rate of the Johannesburg region increased from 4.0% between 1946 and 
1951 to 6.0% between 1960 and 1970. Thereafter, the population growth rate 
declined, falling to a rate of 2.8% per annum between 1991 and 1996 (Fig.2). 
The main reason for these divergent trends is that the boundaries of Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Council are hemmed in by other urban settlements, 
except in the south-west. Consequently, whereas Johannesburg has expanded 
almost as far as its possible geographical limits, the surrounding regions of the 
East and West Rand, Pretoria and the Vaal Triangle have been able to continue 




Population of Greater Johannesburg and




















The racial composition of the Johannesburg region has undergone a radical 
transformation over the past four decades. When the National Party ushered in 
the apartheid period in 1948, about 40% of the population of the Johannesburg 
region was white and most of the remainder was African. Coloureds and Indians 
together made up less than 4% of the population. Since then, in spite of 
apartheid policies to achieve quite the opposite, the African population has 
grown steadily in both relative and absolute terms. By 1996, the proportion of 
white residents had dropped to one-fifth of the population (Fig.3). 
Correspondingly, the African population grew steadily, so that by 1996, African 
residents made up 71% of the population. The population of coloureds and 
Indians increased, but still remained relatively insignificant in 1996, 
contributing only 4% and 2%, respectively, to the total population of the 
Johannesburg region. The primary metropolis of South Africa has therefore 
undergone a demographic transition that has mirrored the political transition to 
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The population data represented in Figure 3 exaggerates the rate of increase of 
the African population since 1991. This is because the official Population 
Censuses for 1980 and 1991 excluded settlements such as Mabopane, Ga-
Rankuwa, Winterveld, and Babalegi that lie to the north and north-west of 
Pretoria. These areas fell within the boundaries of the Bophuthatswana 
‘homeland’ and, in keeping with the policy that granted this territory 
‘independence’ from South Africa, the apartheid government excluded these 
areas from its Population Censuses for those years (Smith, 1982). However, 
since townships such as Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa were officially established 
in the early 1970s, their populations grew steadily as a result of both forced 
relocation from Pretoria, and urbanisation that was displaced by influx control to 
the Bophuthatswana homeland (Hattingh and Horn, 1991). The inclusion of the 
populations of these settlements in the latest census more accurately reflects the 
de facto integration of these populations as long range commuters in the 
Johannesburg regional economy (Pirie, 1992). 
These trends in the racial composition of the population show that Africans 
comprise the vast majority of Johannesburg’s residents. Moreover, according to 
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these trends, the proportion of Africans in the population will increase even 
further. For the purposes of this study, this means that it is the social 
characteristics of the African population that will drive the social characteristics 
of Johannesburg’s population in the future. Specifically, as non-Africans 
become a smaller and smaller proportion of Johannesburg’s population, so the 
contribution of inter-racial inequality to overall inequality will decline. 
Conversely, as Africans increasingly predominate in the population, so intra-
racial inequality among Africans will increasingly contribute to overall 
inequality. The following section of this study therefore turns to an analysis of 
employment trends in the Johannesburg region with a view to understanding 
how these trends have shaped inequality amongst the African population. 
3. Trends in Employment by Economic 
Sector 
Although the community, social and personal services sector remained the 
single largest employer for most of the apartheid period, there have been 
substantial employment shifts in other sectors (Figs. 4 & 5). Before the 1960s, 
the mining sector was the single largest employer of labour. However, as the 
gold ore in the Witwatersrand mines was steadily worked out, mining 
employment moved out of the Johannesburg region to the new gold fields being 
opened up in the Orange Free State. The sudden increase in mining employment 
between 1970 and 1980 was due to the development of new mines on the West 
Rand (Fig. 4). The manufacturing sector, which started out as a service industry 
to the gold mines, grew steadily, so that by the 1960s it had become the largest 
sector after the community, social and personal services sector. Manufacturing 
employment grew steeply during the boom years of the 1960s and early 1970s. 
However, with the onset of a long-term phase of lower output growth, 
manufacturing employment went into sharp decline. Although employment in 
the smaller industrial sectors of (i) construction, (ii) electricity, gas and water 
and (iii) transport and communication grew at a much slower rate during the 
1960s and 1970s, it did not follow the decline of manufacturing employment 
after 1970. Instead, employment in these sectors, apart from a temporary drop in 
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In contrast to employment trends in the manufacturing and mining sectors, 
employment in the tertiary sector continued to grow between 1980 and 1991 
(Fig. 5). Only after 1991 was there a sharp downward trend in employment in 
the community, personal and social services sector and in the commercial sector. 
However, the financial sector continued to grow, employment increasing even 
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What are the likely causes of this precipitous decline of the manufacturing 
sector? There is some agreement among scholars that South Africa’s 
manufacturing sector did not achieve its potential growth. In other words, output 
has been less than expected, given the available resources for economic growth 
(Joffe et al, 1995; Moll, 1991). This weak economic performance has, at least in 
part, been attributed to poor macro-economic management, on one hand, and 
inappropriate domestic policies on the other. Specifically, the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector under the policy of import-substitution during the 1960s 
and 1970s was constrained by the lack of foreign exchange. This problem was 
not remedied by the switch to an export-led policy of industrialisation in the late 
1970s because of high interest rates that made loans prohibitively expensive. As 
far as domestic policies were concerned, there were at least two important 
policies that restricted manufacturing growth in Johannesburg. These were the 
industrial decentralisation and education policies, both of which aimed to curb 
African urbanisation. The former policy forced manufacturers either to cut back 
on African labour or to relocate to remote decentralisation districts. Education 
policy was to limit African urbanisation by restricting the provision of 
secondary education in Johannesburg. This obviously had the effect of 
exacerbating an already chronic shortage of skills. 
These sectoral employment trends for the Johannesburg region suggest that the 
urban labour market has undergone a major structural shift. The only common 
feature of the early and late apartheid periods was the consistently high level of 
employment in the community, social and personal services sector. In all other 
respects, there have been dramatic changes in the sectoral composition of 
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employment. The early apartheid period was characterised by relatively high 
levels of demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the mining and 
manufacturing sectors. The late apartheid period, by contrast, was characterised 
by the increased demand for skilled white-collar and professional employment 
in the commercial and financial sectors. Specifically, in 1970, manufacturing 
employment accounted for 25% of all employment, whereas the commercial and 
financial sectors accounted for 13% and 5%, respectively. By 1996, employment 
levels in the manufacturing, commercial and finance sectors had almost 
converged. Whereas the percentage of the workforce employed in the 
manufacturing sector had dropped to only 14%, the percentages for the 
commercial and financial sectors had increased to 15% and 13%, respectively. 
The 1996 Population Census provides us with useful data for testing our 
hypothesis because it recorded the economic sector of each employed resident. 
The theory that social polarisation of cities is due to economic change associated 
with the shift from manufacturing employment to employment in the tertiary 
sector hinges upon the argument that income and skill distributions are more 
polarised in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector (Sassen, 1994). 
We have tested this theory by comparing the occupational profiles of employees 
in the mining, manufacturing and service sectors. We have broken down service 
sector employment into three categories (Central Statistical Service, 1993). The 
first category is what is often classified as ‘Commerce’ and includes (i) all 
wholesale and retail trade, (ii) the repair of motor vehicles, motor cycles and 
personal and household goods and (iii) the hotel and restaurant trade. The 
second category is ‘Community, Social and Personal Services’. The most 
important areas of employment within this category are (i) government 
administration, (ii) the defence force, (iii) public and private educational 
services, (iv) public and private health services and (v) personal services 
(particularly domestic service). The third category is ‘Financial Intermediation, 
Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services’. 
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Table 1: Percentage distribution of employment in major occupational 






















officials and managers 
2% 6% 11% 8% 2% 
Professionals 5% 5% 2% 17% 21% 
Technicians and 
associated professionals 
3% 7% 7% 17% 7% 
Clerks 3% 8% 14% 26% 7% 
Service workers, shop 
and market sales workers 
3% 4% 28% 18% 11% 
Craft and related trades 
workers 
49% 36% 17% 4% 2% 
Plant and machine 
operators and assemblers 
22% 20% 5% 3% 2% 
Elementary occupations 13% 12% 16% 6% 44% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Important shrinking occupations 
 Important expanding occupations 
 
Occupational profiles prepared from the 1996 Population Census suggest that 
these service sectors are associated with greater skills polarisation. Table 1 
shows that the tertiary sectors employ somewhat higher proportions of 
managers, professionals, technicians/semi-professionals, clerks and sales 
workers than the manufacturing and mining sectors. Similarly, the tertiary 
sectors employ a relatively higher proportion of ‘elementary’ or unskilled 
workers than the manufacturing and mining sectors. Specifically, the 
managerial, professional, technical, clerical and sales occupations account for 
20% of all employment in the commerce sector, 42% in the finance sector and 
30% in the community, social and personal service sector. These percentages are 
substantially higher than the 10% and 18% for the mining and manufacturing 
sectors, respectively (Table 3). The same can be said for the category of 
‘elementary’ or unskilled occupations. Unskilled employment accounts for 44% 
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of jobs in the community, social and personal service sector and 16% of jobs in 
the commerce sector. This is somewhat higher than the 13% and 12% for the 
mining and manufacturing sectors, respectively. The only tertiary sub-sector that 
does not follow the pattern is finance, which has a very low percentage (6%) of 
unskilled employment (Table 3). 
This structural shift in the demand for employment has been an important cause 
of rising inequality among the urban African population. We argue that the 
urban labour market of the pre- and early apartheid period needed a relatively 
high proportion of unskilled manual labour. This period therefore offered 
employment opportunities for poorly educated rural migrants, many of whom 
used this opportunity to urbanise permanently. However, the late apartheid 
period saw the decline in the demand for unskilled labour and even semi-skilled 
manual work and the relative rise in demand for white-collar employment. This 
meant that during the 1980s and 1990s, educated Africans who had urbanised 
during the early apartheid period were relatively well placed to secure 
employment in these more skilled jobs. By contrast, poorly educated rural 
migrants, who were qualified only for unskilled work, were much more likely to 
face unemployment. In other words, much greater levels of social polarisation 
are evident in the later period. This argument is elaborated in the following 
sections. 
4. African Differentiation in the Urban Labour 
Market5 
Throughout its history, the gold mining industry on the Witwatersrand has relied 
primarily upon the cheap labour of rural migrants. The relatively small number 
of skilled jobs were occupied by whites who, through their trade unions and with 
government support, jealously guarded their wages and jobs against 
undercutting by unskilled African labour. Employment opportunities for African 
workers were therefore numerous, but restricted to unskilled and semi-skilled 
manual jobs. Consequently, Africans who worked in the mining industry were 
poorly educated rural migrants who had few other opportunities for urban 
employment. The manufacturing industry was not much different. White 
workers, usually from urban backgrounds and with higher levels of education, 
were in a better position than Africans to secure the top-end of semi-skilled 
factory jobs. The skilled trades were also dominated by white workers who 
excluded Africans from apprenticeships and employment in the skilled trades. 
5 This section draws upon Crankshaw, O. 1997. Race, Class and the Changing Division of 
Labour Under Apartheid. Routledge, London. 
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When the jobs of white workers were threatened by undercutting from cheaper 
African labour, they were usually successful in lobbying the government to 
reserve certain occupations for white employment only. So, in a similar fashion 
to the mining industry, African employment in the manufacturing sector was 
restricted to unskilled and lower paid levels of semi-skilled work which were 
attractive to poorly educated rural migrants. 
We know very little about the urbanisation careers of these African workers 
subsequent to their arrival in Johannesburg. However, we do know that the 
African population of Johannesburg grew steadily as a result of the demand for 
their labour in the mines and factories. By the 1940s, this led to a housing crisis 
and squatter movements sprang up all over the Witwatersrand (Bonner, 1990). 
The response of the government was to provide low-cost public housing for 
Africans on an unprecedented scale during the 1950s and early 1960s. Although 
the provision of this housing went hand in hand with forced removals, tight 
controls over the urbanisation of Africans and the racial segregation of 
Johannesburg’s residential areas, it nonetheless granted permanent urban status 
to a large number of African families. In the subsequent decades of the 1960s 
and 1970s, Government policies and laws continued to draw a deep division 
between Africans with urban rights and those without them (Hindson, 1987). 
Africans who were not born within the urban boundaries of Johannesburg region 
could not qualify for permanent urban residence. These rural-born migrants who 
were employed in the Johannesburg region were granted only temporary urban 
rights and were forced to live in hostels while their families continued to live at 
their rural home. By contrast, Africans with urban rights were free to live and 
work in the Johannesburg region, although only in prescribed areas and jobs. 
The overall impact of these policies was to reinforce and perpetuate the division 
between urbanised and migrant Africans. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Johannesburg region experienced sustained and 
rapid growth in employment. This led to a chronic shortage of white labour, first 
in the skilled manual trades and then later in white-collar occupations. 
Employers responded to this shortage by calling for the fragmentation of the 
skilled trades and for the employment of African labour in these fragmented 
semi-skilled tasks, which were the preserve of skilled white artisans. This 
entailed confronting white trade unions and lobbying the Government to reform 
both its employment and educational policies towards urban Africans. During 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, a set of compromises between business, white 
unions and the Government was struck. The essence of these agreements, across 
a variety of sectors, was that Africans could be advanced into semi-skilled, 
supervisory and white-collar jobs on the condition that this did not adversely 
affect the employment conditions of white workers. This period of accelerated 
growth in output therefore saw the expansion of semi-skilled machine operative 
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employment, which entailed precisely those jobs which had been opened up for 
African employment. However, not all Africans benefited equally from this 
growth in semi-skilled employment. Since employers were increasing obliged to 
train African workers for these more skilled jobs, they began to switch from a 
low-wage, low-skill employment strategy to a high-wage, high-skill strategy. By 
increasing wages, employers aimed to both attract and retain better-educated 
labour. Since migrant workers were both less educated and had a higher 
turnover, employers began to prefer urbanised African workers (Crankshaw, 
1997: 110-112). So, whereas up until the 1950s manufacturers usually preferred 
to employ migrant workers because they were cheaper, by the end of the 1960s 
these same employers were turning to urbanised African workers instead (Posel, 
1991: 169). 
Somewhat later, shortages of white labour began to manifest themselves in the 
tertiary sector. These sectors were poorly unionised and white workers showed 
little inclination to resist the employment of Africans in routine clerical and 
sales work. Under pressure from business, state educational policy was reformed 
to increase the supply of educated African labour in urban areas. Consequently, 
businesses began to employ Africans in white-collar and semi-professional 
occupations from the late 1960s. The beneficiaries of these reforms were mostly 
urban Africans who were educated in the new urban high schools that were 
established from the early 1970s. 
However, if opportunities for upward occupational mobility were improving for 
educated Africans, the reverse was true for those whose education had not 
prepared them for anything but unskilled manual work. The growing preference 
of employers for more capital-intensive methods of production and the 
employment of semi-skilled African machine operatives resulted in the steady 
decline in the demand for unskilled manual labour. The falling demand for 
unskilled workers coincided with growing unemployment levels. The relatively 
low pace of employment growth from the mid-1970s did not match the 
population growth rate and the discrepancy has been the major cause of rising 
unemployment in South Africa since the end of the 1960s (Bell and Padayachee, 
1984). 
So, the late apartheid period was characterised by the occupational 
differentiation of the urban African population. On one hand, reforms to 
apartheid policy opened up more skilled and professional work for educated and 
urbanised Africans in the secondary and tertiary sectors. On the other hand, 
employment opportunities for unskilled African workers, who were usually rural 
migrants, declined. 
There is some quantitative evidence to support our argument concerning the 
causes of increasing differentiation within the African population of 
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Johannesburg. This evidence is based on the results of a household survey of 
Soweto, the largest African township in the Johannesburg region. These results 
are based on interviews with a senior adult in the household, usually the major 
breadwinner. The interviewers recorded the respondent’s place and date of birth. 
If the respondent was not born in greater Johannesburg, the interviewer recorded 
the year in which s/he first moved there. The interviewers also recorded the 
respondent’s employment status and occupation. We then categorised the 
respondents into four groups according to where they were born and when they 
entered the urban labour market. We chose 1980 as the cut-off point because this 
was the census year that marked the beginning of the decline of employment in 
the manufacturing industry. So, respondents who were born outside the 
Johannesburg region were divided into two groups: those who arrived in the 
region before 1980 and those who arrived in 1980 or later. For respondents who 
were born in the Johannesburg region, we assumed that they entered the labour 
market at the age of 20 and divided them into those who were born before 1960 
and those who were born in 1960 and later. Controlling for place of birth, our 
aim was to compare the employment status and occupation of respondents who 
had entered the labour market before 1980 with those who had entered the 
labour market during and after 1980. 
The results of this analysis ( see Table 2 ) show that there is a distinct difference 
in the employment status of residents who were either born in the region ( before 
or after 1960 being immaterial ) or who urbanised before 1980, on one hand, and 
those who urbanised during or after 1980 on the other. Whereas the former have 
an unemployment rate of about 25%, the latter have an unemployment rate of 
30%. In other words, respondents who were born in the Johannesburg region 
had the same unemployment rate, regardless of when they entered the labour 
market. By contrast, there was a distinct difference among rural born 
respondents: whereas 22% of those who urbanised before 1980 were 
unemployed, the unemployment rate of those who urbanised during or after 
1980 was significantly higher, at 30%.6 
 
6 The sample size for these estimates is large enough to ensure that they are accurate to 
within 5% with a 95% level of confidence. 
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Table 2: Percentage distribution of employment status of Sowetans by 
year of birth or arrival in the Johannesburg region (1997)7 
 
 Born in the 
Johannesburg Region 
Born outside the 
Johannesburg Region 
 
 Born before 
1960 





1980 or later 
Employed full-time 60% 59% 64% 56% 
Employed part-time 5% 6% 4% 9% 
Self-employed 6% 9% 9% 5% 
Unemployed 25% 25% 22% 30% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 







                                          
7 The results presented in this table are based on a household survey of the African townships 
of Greater Soweto which was conducted during February 1997. Altogether, 2,947 
interviews were conducted, using a stratified cluster sample.  For a detailed discussion of 
the sampling method, refer to Morris et al (1999). 
The questionnaire and sample was designed by Owen Crankshaw in consultation with 
other members of the Soweto in Transition Committee, Sociology Department, University 
of the Witwatersrand. The logistical aspects of the fieldwork were managed by Progressus 
cc. and the quality of the interviews and the sample was monitored in the field by Owen 
Crankshaw. The authors are grateful to the members of the Soweto in Transition 
Committee (Sociology Department, University of the Witwatersrand) for their permission 
to use the results of the Soweto Household Survey. We also acknowledge the financial 
contributions made to the Soweto Household Survey by the Johannesburg Metropolitan 




Similarly, there is some evidence to show that Sowetan adults who were born 
in the Johannesburg region or who had urbanised there before 1980 were more 
likely to establish themselves in clerical and sales jobs or semi-professional, 
professional and managerial careers than their fellow residents who had 
urbanised from 1980 onwards. The percentage of respondents employed in these 
white-collar occupations who were either born in the Johannesburg region or 
who had arrived there before 1980 was almost twice that of those who had 
urbanised from 1980 onwards (Table 3). Specifically, the percentage of 
respondents employed in these white-collar jobs who were born in the 
Johannesburg region was 33% (born before 1960) and 36% (born after 1960). 
The respondents who had urbanised before 1980 were somewhat less successful 
in securing white-collar employment, with a percentage of 26%. Respondents 
who had urbanised after 1980 were even less successful, with only 18% of them 
employed in such white-collar jobs. So, these findings suggest that the more 
recent newcomers to the Johannesburg region have been less successful in 
securing white-collar employment than established urbanites and those who had 
arrived before 1980. 
 
Table 3: Percentage distribution of the occupations of employed 
Sowetans by year of birth or arrival in the Johannesburg region (1997). 
 Born in the  
Johannesburg Region 
Born outside the 
Johannesburg Region  
 Born before 
1960 





1980 or later 
Never Employed 4% 5% 3% 5% 
Unskilled Manual Worker 30% 14% 36% 25% 
Semi-Skilled Manual Worker 30% 42% 30% 39% 
Routine Security Worker 2% 2% 4% 11% 
Clerical or Sales Worker 17% 25% 14% 13% 
Professional, Semi-
professionals & Managers 
16% 11% 12% 5% 
Other 1% 2% 1% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 




On the face of it, these results do not support our hypothesis as strongly as we 
expected them to. One reason for this may be that Soweto is atypical of African 
townships in the Johannesburg region. It is generally understood to have a 
population that is relatively better off than most other townships, including the 
formal townships of the East Rand (Seekings, 1988.). If survey results of 
Alexandra (a traditionally poorer township to the north of Johannesburg), 
Orange Farm (a new informal settlement) or Winterveld (a sprawling homeland 
settlement near Pretoria) were considered, the differences in unemployment 
rates between urbanites and recent migrants are likely to be greater. 
Unfortunately, there are no appropriate survey data for these areas. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we have made an attempt to identify and measure the relationship 
between urbanisation and inequality in the Johannesburg region. Our starting 
point is the finding that inequality in South Africa is increasingly being driven 
by causes that are intra-racial in character rather than inter-racial. We have 
explored the hypothesis that there is an important division between urbanised 
Africans on one hand, and rural migrants or recently urbanised, rural-born 
Africans, on the other. Our inspiration for this hypothesis comes from the 
literature on social polarisation, which identifies a relationship between de-
industrialisation and rising inequality among new arrivals in major urban 
centres. 
We have tested this hypothesis by examining changing urbanisation policy and 
employment trends during the apartheid period. Our findings show that the 
Johannesburg region has experienced a dramatic decline in manufacturing 
employment since the late 1970s. Over the same period, there has been an 
increase in service sector employment. In conjunction with the probable effects 
of apartheid policies on African urbanisation, education and employment, these 
overall employment trends have, at least in part, contributed towards growing 
inequality between established urban Africans, on one hand, and rural-born 
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